In an information technology services outsourcing arrangement, variance in demand volume and individual user preferences pose significant challenges to the provider organization in making resource allocation decisions. Such variations affect service levels, especially under fixed resource constraints. We explore the possible role of periodic demand information sharing and subsequent resource-level adjustments as a means of addressing issues arising from demand variation. As information exchange alters the dynamics of the relationship between the customer and provider organizations, incorporating information sharing in service-level agreements requires modifying current pricing schemes. A pricing heuristic is developed and tested under varying levels of information accuracy and granularity. The heuristic is shown to provide better economic welfare for both participants in comparison to the baseline pricing strategies considered. Also, it is shown that information, even at a coarse level of granularity, is very effective in providing stable service levels--a finding that is encouraging for enhanced collaborations between customer and provider organizations in outsourcing arrangements.
Competition from open source software and free software (OSS/FS) alternatives is causing proprietary software producers to reevaluate product strategies. OSS/FS alternatives complicate an already complex information goods market plagued by piracy concerns. Although producer perspectives on software pricing and piracy controls have been addressed extensively, consumers' perspective and willingness to pay for commercial software is not very well understood. This paper empirically determines willingness to pay for a leading commercial software application (Microsoft Office) in the presence of an OSS/FS alternative. A contingent valuation approach is used to elicit willingness to pay for the application. The research design employs a 2 × 2 × 2 experiment to investigate the impact of preventive control, deterrence control, and OSS/FS alternative. The results indicate that the availability of an OSS/FS alternative has little impact on willingness to pay for Microsoft Office. However, piracy controls significantly increase willingness to pay for Microsoft Office, even in the presence of OSS/FS alternatives.
A key feature of service-oriented models of information technology is the promise of prespecified quality levels enforceable via service level agreements (SLAs). This poses difficult management problems when considerable variability exists in user preferences and service demand within any organization. Because variance in expectations impact service levels, effective pricing and resource allocation mechanisms are needed to deliver services at the promised quality level. In this paper, we propose a mechanism for SLA formulation that is responsive to demand fluctuations and user preference variance, with the objective of maximizing organizational welfare of the participants. This formulation features a dynamic priority based price-penalty scheme targeted to individual users. An analytical model is presented and evaluated for effectiveness of a proposed dynamic priority-based pricing scheme vis-à-vis a baseline fixed-price single-quality level SLA. Simulations using data from an existing SLA is used to provide evidence that the proposed dynamic pricing scheme is likely to be more effective than a fixed-price approach from a system welfare perspective.